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IntroductIon 
Climate change is real. The climate gap is real. 
What we used to think was tomorrow’s climate 
crisis is here today. Heat waves, wild fires and 
floods are making headlines more often. What 
hasn’t made headlines—yet—is the climate gap: 
the disproportionate and unequal impact the climate 
crisis has on people of color and the poor. Unless 
something is done, the consequences of America’s 
climate crisis will harm all Americans—especially 
those who are least able to anticipate, cope with, 
resist and recover from the worst consequences. 
This analysis is of California, which in many ways is a 
microcosm of the entire United States. 
Climate change is an issue of great importance for 
human rights, public health, and social fairness 
because of its profound consequences overall and 
the very real danger that poor neighborhoods and 
people of color will suffer even worse harms and 
hazards than the rest of Americans. This “climate 
gap” is of special concern for California, home to 
one of the most ethnically and economically diverse 
populations in the country. 
The climate gap means that communities of color and 
the poor will suffer more during extreme heat waves. 
For instance, African Americans in Los Angeles are 
nearly twice as likely to die from a heat wave than 
other Los Angeles residents, and families living below 
the poverty line are unlikely to have access to air 
conditioning or cars that allow them to escape the 
heat. 
The climate gap means that communities of color and 
the poor will breathe even dirtier air. For example, 
five of the smoggiest cities in California also have the 
highest densities of people of color and low-income 
residents. These communities are projected to suffer 
from the largest increase in smog associated with 
climate change. 
The climate gap means that communities of color 
and the poor will pay more for basic necessities. 
Low-income and minority families already spend as 
much as 25 percent of their entire income on just 
food, electricity and water—much more than most 
Americans. 
The climate gap is likely to mean fewer job 
opportunities for communities of color and the poor. 
The climate crisis may dramatically reduce or shift 
job opportunities in sectors such as agriculture and 
tourism, which predominantly employ low-income 
Americans and people of color. 
This report—an analysis and synthesis of available 
data—explores disparities in the impacts of climate 
change and the abilities of different groups to adapt 
to it. It also offers concrete recommendations for 
closing the climate gap, starting with insuring that 
climate solutions don’t leave anyone behind. 
Methodology 
This report analyzes currently available data on the 
disparate impacts of climate change and climate 
change mitigation policies on low socioeconomic 
status (SES) groups in the United States that 
is relevant to the California context (Shonkoff, 
Morello-Frosch et al. 2009). We have also drawn 
information from climate change policy, human 
health, and environmental justice literature to provide 
background and context for these issues. Our goal 
was to address some of the prominent public health, 
equity, and regulatory issues that are pertinent to the 
policy deliberations surrounding the implementation 
of AB 32, The Global Warming Solutions Act as well 
as federal climate change policy. 
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There is a Climate Gap
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Key FIndIngs
There is a climate gap. The health 
consequences of climate change will harm 
all Americans—but the poor and people of 
color will be hit the worst.  
The Climate Gap in  
extreme Heat Waves 
Extreme weather events, such as heat waves, 
droughts, and floods are expected to increase in their 
frequency and intensity in the next hundred years 
due to climate change (IPCC 2007), which could 
increase the risk of illnesses and deaths linked to 
extreme heat. 
extreme Heat leads to increased illnesses and 
Deaths—Particularly among the elderly, infants and 
african americans.
 
In a study on nine California counties from May 
through September of 1999–2003, researchers 
found that for every 10°F (5.6°C) increase in 
temperature, there is a 2.6 percent  increase in 
cardiovascular deaths. The risks were higher for 
persons at least 65 years of age, infants one year 
of age or less  (Figure 1), and African Americans 
(Figure 2).
A study on the 2006 California heat wave (July 
15–August 1, 2006) showed that emergency room 
visits increased by 16,166 and that there were 1,182 
additional hospitalizations statewide, compared to a 
similar time period when there was no heat wave.  In 
particular, the magnitude of heat-related illnesses 
on emergency department visits was dramatic. 
Statewide, there was a six-fold increase in heat-
related emergency department visits and a more 
than 10-fold increase in heat-related hospitalizations 
(Knowlton et al. 2009). Another study on seven 
counties impacted by the 2006 heat wave indicated 
a nine percent (95 percent CI = 1.6, 16.3) increase 
in daily mortality per 10 degrees Fahrenheit change 
in apparent temperature for all counties combined. 
This estimate is almost three times larger than the 
effect estimated for the full warm season and 1.3 
times higher than during July in previous years 
(non heat wave years 1999 to 2003). The estimates 
indicate that actual mortality during the July 2006 
heat wave was two or three times greater than initial 
coroner estimates of 147 deaths (Ostro et al. 2009).
Figure 1. Percent change in mortality associated with 10˚F increase in  mean 
daily temperature by age group in nine California counties. May through 
September, 1999–2003 (Source: Basu and Ostro 2008).
Figure 2. Percent change in mortality associated with 10˚F increase in  mean 
daily temperature by race/ethnicity in nine California counties. May through 
September, 1999–2003 (Source: Basu and Ostro 2008).
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Emergency department visits for heat-related 
illnesses increased across California, especially in 
the Central Coast, including San Francisco. Further, 
emergency department visits showed statistically 
significant increases in acute renal failure, diabetes, 
cardiovascular diseases, electrolyte imbalance, and 
nephritis (Knowlton et al. 2009). Children (0–4 years 
of age), the elderly (≥ 65 years of age) (Knowlton et 
al. 2009), and low-income African Americans (Basu 
and Ostro 2008) appear more likely to get sick or die 
from heat wave effects than others.
Risk Factors for Heat-Related illness and Death are 
Higher for low-income Neighborhoods and People of 
Color. 
Although heat exposure alone can cause illness or 
death, physiological, social and economic factors are 
integral in explaining the uneven distribution among 
diverse populations (Epstein and Rodgers 2004). 
Risk factors for heat-associated illness and death can 
be categorized as natural factors (i.e., age, disability) 
or external factors resulting from social or economic 
conditions (e.g., housing quality, access to cooling 
centers, transportation). 
In terms of natural factors, people suffering from 
chronic medical conditions have a greater risk of 
dying during heat waves (Epstein and Rodgers 
2004; Kovats and Hajat 2008; Kilbourne 1997). In 
fact, a study on the heat-specific mortality during 
the 2003 heat wave in France reported that over 
70 percent of the home victims had medical pre-
conditions, particularly cardiovascular and/or 
psychological illness (Poumadere et al. 2005). Low-
income individuals are disproportionately affected 
by medical conditions due to their lack of access to 
technological, informational, and social resources 
to cope with these conditions (Phelan et al. 2004). 
Further, epidemiologic studies of heat-associated 
mortality show an increased risk among the elderly; 
especially among those older than 50 years of age 
(Kovats and Hajat 2008). 
THe HeaT iSlaND eFFeCT: The increased heat created by 
a lack of tree cover in an urban area exacerbated by an 
abundance of dark-colored materials used to construct 
roads and buildings. The roads and buildings absorb 
the heat, creating a heat island effect. 
In terms of external factors, low-income urban 
neighborhoods and communities of color are 
particularly vulnerable to increased frequency of heat 
waves and higher temperatures because they are 
often segregated in the inner city (Schultz et al. 2002; 
Williams and Collins 2001), which is more likely to 
experience the “heat-island” effect. The heat-island 
effect occurs in urban areas because dark-colored 
materials used to construct roads, buildings, and other 
structures absorb heat and do not allow it to dissipate 
at the same rate as soil, grass, forests, and other less-
industrial materials (Oke 1973). 
Research has shown a positive relationship between 
the presence of concrete, heat-trapping surfaces 
and community poverty, and a negative relationship 
between the amount of tree cover and the level 
of community poverty in four California urban 
areas (Figure 3). This suggests the potential for a 
disproportionate burden of heat-island exposure to 
low-income populations compared with higher-income 
populations. This trend is extended to people of color 
that reside in a given neighborhood: there is a positive 
relationship between the proportion of people of color 
and proportion of concrete, heat-trapping surfaces and 
a negative relationship between proportion of people 
of color and amount of tree cover (Figure 4). (Morello-
Frosch and Jesdale 2008)
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Figure 4. Land cover characteristics by percent of residents of color living in the neighborhood (Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco metro areas 
Adapted from: Morello-Frosch and Jesdale 2008.
Figure 3. Land cover characteristics by percent of households living below the poverty line (Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco metro areas). Adapted 
from: Morello-Frosch and Jesdale 2008.
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Figure 5. Map showing realtive risk of emergency department visit for heat-related illnesses during the summer 2006 heat wave (July 15–August 1 2006) compared 
with a reference period (July 8–14 and August 12–22, 2006) for six California regions (Source: Knowlton et al. 2009).
Figure 6. Geographic location of deaths due to heat wave. July 2006 (Source: English et al 2007)
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african americans in los angeles Nearly Twice as 
likely to Die from a Heat Wave 
Another indicator that African Americans may bear 
a disproportionate burden of heat-wave mortality is 
the fact that African American Los Angeles residents 
have a projected heat-wave mortality rate that is nearly 
twice that of the Los Angeles average (Figure 7). 
agricultural and Construction Workers also at 
increased Risk of Death 
California’s agricultural and construction workers 
have experienced severe heat-related illness and 
death with data pointing towards possible increasing 
trends in recent years (English et al. 2007; Luginbuhl 
2008). The socioeconomic status of predominantly 
Mexican and Central American immigrants who 
come to California to work in the agricultural and 
construction sectors makes them particularly 
vulnerable because of the cumulative impacts of 
their long workdays under strenuous conditions, 
limited capacity to protect their rights, and exposure 
to chemicals such as pesticides. Between the 
Figure 7. Relative heat-wave mortality rates by race/ethnicity for Los Angeles* 
(Source: cited from Cordova et al. 2006)
* Actual historical values (1989–1998) and projected future values (2050s and 
2090s) for high-emissions (A1fi) and low-emissions (B1) scenarios. (HadCM3 
projections only.) 
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years 1992–2002, 40 percent of the crop workers 
who died due to heat-associated complications 
were identified as Mexican or Central or South 
American (Luginbuhl 2008) and 72 percent of these 
deaths were among adults aged 20–54 years, a 
population typically considered to be at low-risk for 
heat illnesses (Luginbuhl 2008). A recent study of 
the 2006 California heat wave found significantly 
increased rates of emergency department visits and 
hospitalizations for cardiac-related illnesses statewide 
only among Latinos/Hispanics (Knowlton et al. 2009), 
which may be related to occupational heat exposures 
among Latino/Hispanic crop workers (Luginbuhl 
et al. 2008). As heat-wave incidence and intensity 
increases with climate change, these disparities will 
persist, if not increase.
air Conditioning a Critical Coping Tool for Heat 
Waves—but Not everyone Has access
Studies have documented that lack of access to air 
conditioning is linked to the disproportionate risk 
of heat-related illness and death among the urban 
elderly in the United States—particularly those who 
are low-income or of color (Kovats and Hajat 2008; 
Semenza et al. 1996).
Overall, low-income families and people of color 
are less likely to have access to air-conditioning 
(English et al. 2007). In the Los Angeles-Long Beach 
Metropolitan Area, for example, many more African 
American households do not have access to air 
conditioning compared to the general population. 
Similar trends hold for Latinos and communities 
living below the poverty line (UCSB 2004) (Table 1). 
This disparity is important particularly because some 
communities are instructed to stay indoors and avoid 
outdoor pollution exposures on particularly hot days.
Moreover, a thorough analysis based on several 
different studies using heat-wave data from Chicago, 
Detroit, Minneapolis, and Pittsburgh shows that for 
each 10 percent increase in central air conditioner 
(AC) prevalence, heat-associated mortality decreased 
by 1.4 percent. The overall effect of heat on mortality 
was a 10.2 percent increase. African Americans were 
found to have a 5.3 percent higher prevalence of 
heat-related mortality than Whites and 64 percent of 
this disparity is potentially attributable to disparities 
in prevalence of central AC technologies (O’Neil, 
Zanobetti et al. 2005). 
Transportation is also a Critical Coping Tool During a 
Heat Wave—but african americans, latinos and asians 
less likely to have access to a Car
In the Los Angeles-Long Beach Metropolitan Area, 
higher proportions of African-American (20 percent), 
Latino (17.1 percent), and Asian (9.8 percent) 
households do not have access to a car (UCSB 
2004), compared to White households (7.9 percent), 
thus restricting their capacity to move to cooler areas 
and government-sponsored cooling stations during 
extreme heat events.
Table 1. Percent of households without access to any air conditioning by race and SES – Los Angeles-Long Beach Metropolitan Area, California (2003)*
 * Percentages are likely an underestimate of the true value due to the fact that more than one category may apply to a single unit in the dataset.
Adapted from: American Housing Survey for the Los Angeles-Long Beach Metropolitan Area 2004 (USCB 2004).
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The Climate Gap in  
Health Hazards from 
increased air Pollution 
Research suggests that the majority of the health 
effects due to air pollution are caused by ozone 
(O3) and particulate matter (PM) (Drechsler et 
al. 2006). However, it should be noted that many 
other pollutants that are associated with climate 
change, such as nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and 
carbon monoxide, also have health consequences 
(Drechsler et al. 2006). 
Five of the ten most ozone-polluted metropolitan 
areas in the United States (Los Angeles, Bakersfield, 
Visalia, Fresno, and Sacramento) are in California 
(Cordova et al. 2006; ALA 2008). Because of this, 
Californians already suffer a relatively high disease 
burden from air pollution – including 18,000 
premature deaths each year and tens of thousands 
of other illnesses (CARB 2008a). 
But climate change threatens to exacerbate 
California’s dirty air problem. Higher temperatures 
hasten chemical interactions between nitrogen 
oxide, volatile organic gases and sunlight that lead 
to increases in ambient ozone concentrations in 
urban areas (Jacobson 2008). In California, five 
of the smoggiest cities are also the locations with 
the highest projections of ambient ozone increases 
associated with climate change, as well as the 
highest densities of people of color and low-income 
residents. 
People of color and the poor in these urban areas 
are likely to lack health insurance (Cordova et al. 
2006). A lack of health insurance among vulnerable 
populations that are exposed to elevated levels of air 
pollutants may lead to greater health impacts from 
air pollution—particularly compared with those who 
have health insurance. 
Moreover, a recent study found that for each 1 
degree Celsius (1°C) rise in temperature in the 
United States, there are an estimated 20–30 excess 
cancer cases, as well as approximately 1000 (CI: 
350–1800) excess air-pollution-associated deaths 
(Jacobson 2008). About 40 percent of the additional 
deaths may be due to ozone and the rest to 
particulate matter annually (Jacobson 2008; Bailey 
et al. 2008). Three hundred of these annual deaths 
are thought to occur in California (Bailey et al. 2008).
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There is a climate gap. The economic consequences 
of climate change will hit low-income neighborhoods 
and minorities the hardest.  
The Climate Gap in How  
Much Some People Pay for 
Basic Necessities
Prices for Basic Necessities expected to Skyrocket as 
a Result of Climate Change
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
estimates that under a business-as-usual scenario, 
between the years 2025 and 2100, the cost of 
providing water to the western states in the United 
States will increase from $200 billion to $950 billion 
dollars per year, representing an estimated 0.93–1 
percent of the United States’ gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Ackerman and Stanton 2008). Further, it is 
predicted that, under the same scenario, annual U.S. 
energy expenditures (excluding transportation) will 
be $141 billion higher in 2100 than they would be 
if today’s climate conditions continued throughout 
the century. This increase is equal to approximately 
0.14 percent of the United State’s GDP (Ackerman 
and Stanton 2008). Four climate change impacts—
hurricane damage, energy costs, real estate losses, 
and water costs—alone are projected to cost 1.8 
percent of the GDP of the United States, or, just 
under $1.9 trillion in 2008 U.S. dollars by the year 
2100 (Ackerman and Stanton 2008).
Figure 8. Household expenditures on water, electricity, and food by income bracket (as percentage of total expenditures)* (Source: Adapted From BLS 2002 and cited 
from Cordova et al. 2006)
* Expenditure quintile is a proxy for income with quintile 1 representing the lowest-income households and quintile 5 representing the highest-income households. 
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low-income Families already Spend a Bigger 
Proportion of Their income on Food, energy and Other 
Household Needs Than Higher-income Families. With 
Climate Change, That Spending Gap Will Grow. 
These price increases will disproportionately impact 
groups that spend the highest proportion of their 
income on these necessities (BLS 2002). There is 
a nearly three-fold difference in the proportion of 
the sum of expenses allocated to water between 
the lowest- and the highest-income brackets. 
Households in the lowest income bracket use more 
than twice the proportion of their total expenditures 
on electricity than do those households in the highest 
income bracket. Similarly, food, the commodity 
that represents the largest portion of total spending 
out of all the basic necessities in the expenditure 
brackets, shows a two-fold discrepancy between the 
lowest and the highest income households (Figure 
2) (Cordova et al. 2006). Because in the coming 
decades climate change impacts are projected to 
increase the prices of necessities (Ackerman and 
Stanton 2008), low-income people who already 
are paying a higher proportion of their income 
for necessities will potentially be subjected to 
increasingly disproportionate economic impacts of 
climate change. 
The Climate Gap  
in Job Opportunities 
Climate Change Will Dramatically Reduce Job 
Opportunities or Cause Major Employment Shifts 
in Sectors that Predominately Employ Low-Income 
People of Color. 
The majority of jobs in sectors that will likely be 
significantly affected by climate change, such as 
agriculture and tourism, are held by low-income 
people of color (UCSB 2005; EDD 2004). These 
workers would be the first to lose their jobs in the 
event of an economic downturn due to climatic 
troubles.
Fewer and also More Dangerous agriculture Jobs 
Impacts on the agricultural sector will fuel the climate 
gap in California. Latinos comprise 77 percent of 
the workforce in this sector and the majority of these 
men and women are also categorized as low-income 
(EDD 2004). In California, as of 2003, agriculture 
provided approximately 500,000 jobs with 315,000 
of them being held by Latinos (EDD 2004). The 
majority of these jobs are seasonal, do not pay more 
than $7.50 per hour, and do not provide health 
insurance or job security. Because of the low wages 
and the seasonality of the work, agricultural counties 
are among the poorest in the state (Cordova, 
Gelobter et al. 2006).
Research suggests that climate change will affect 
employment within the agricultural sector in three 
main ways: 
Increases in the frequency and the intensity of 1. 
extreme weather events will expose agriculture 
to greater productivity risks and (Lee et al. 2009) 
possible revenue losses that could lead to abrupt 
layoffs.  
Changing weather and precipitation patterns 2. 
could require expensive adaptation measures 
such as relocating crop cultivation, changing 
the composition or type of crops and increasing 
inputs such as pesticides to adapt to changes 
in ecological composition that lead to economic 
denigration and job loss (Cordova et al. 2006).  
As climate change adversely affects agricultural 3. 
productivity in California, laborers will be 
increasingly affected by job loss. For example, 
the two highest-value agricultural products 
in California’s $30 billion agriculture sector 
are dairy products (milk and cream, valued 
at $3.8 billion annually) and grapes ($3.2 
billion annually) (CASS 2002). Climate change 
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is expected to decrease dairy production by 
between 7–22 percent by the end of the century 
(Pittock 2001). It is also expected to adversely 
affect the ripening of wine grapes, substantially 
reducing their market value (Hayhoe 2004). 
Communities in the Central Valley, where agriculture 
is most concentrated and with a significant 
proportion of low-income Latino residents, would 
be the hardest hit by these projected declines in 
agricultural productivity linked to climate change.
Fewer Jobs in Tourism, an industry employing a High 
Number of low-income People of Color 
Tourism is already quite vulnerable to market 
conditions because the ability to travel is heavily 
based on access to disposable income. Although 
there are no formal predictions of changes to leisure 
travel that exist beyond the year 2020 (UNWTO 
2007), there is concern that climate change may 
lead to jobs being retracted and downsized (Cordova 
et al. 2006; UNWTO 2007). Effects of climate 
change on the tourism industry could be seen in 
the form of shorter employment periods and lower 
wages as the industry struggles to deal with physical, 
temporal, economic, and climatic issues. 
In California, sea-side destinations and mountainous 
regions are likely to be particularly impacted (IPCC 
2007; UNWTO 2007). Because of shifts in the types 
of recreational opportunities that will likely remain 
available in California due to climate change, the 
jobs of current tourism laborers may be at risk. In 
all of the major industries that have been generated 
by tourism—with the exception of the entertainment 
industry—people of color make up the majority of 
the workforce and could be vulnerable to layoffs 
and decreased pay (Figure 9) (Cordova et al. 2006). 
The tourism employment category comprised of the 
greatest proportion of people of color is “traveler 
accommodations” which consists of hotel and motel 
Figure 9. Percent of people of color in tourism-generated jobs, by sector, 2003 (Source: cited from Cordova 2006).
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workers. It is uncertain whether these same workers, 
or these same demographics in general, would be 
hired to work in new tourism activities if the industry 
shifts to other geographic locations or shrinks in size.
Even excluding agriculture and tourism, industries 
in California that are considered heavy emitters of 
greenhouse gases have a workforce that is sixty 
percent people of color; the non-heavy emitting 
industries are fifty-two percent workers of color.  
These heavy emitting industries tend to pay slightly 
higher wages and be more unionized. Addressing  
greenhouse gas emissions without an adequate 
transition plan for incumbent workers and targeting 
opportunities for communities of color in the new 
“green jobs” sector could widen the racial economic 
divide (Buffa, et. al). 
The Climate Gap in  
extreme Weather insurance 
As extreme weather events such as wildfires, 
hurricanes and floods become more common, severe 
damage and destruction to homes will also increase. 
Swiss Re (2006) indicates that insurance losses have 
been on an upward trend since 1985. During the 
years 1987–2004 property insurance losses due to 
natural disasters averaged $23 billion per year and in 
2005, losses rose to $83 billion, of which $60 billion 
was due to hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma alone 
(Swiss Re 2006). 
Households that have home or renters’ insurance can, 
relatively rapidly, recuperate and resume living much 
in the same way as prior to the disaster. In contrast, 
low-income communities—which are often under-
insured—may spend the rest of their lives struggling to 
recover from property damage related to an extreme 
weather event (Fothergill and Peek 2004; Blaikie et al. 
1994; Thomalla et al. 2006). 
Further, the frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather events due to climate change will increase 
the price of disaster insurance, making it prohibitively 
expensive for low-income people and decreasing their 
ability to cope with future losses. 
Finally, the disproportionate impact of extreme 
weather events on low-income families and people 
of color could exacerbate homelessness, especially 
in urban areas. This would be largely due to 
the lack of access to insurance and emergency 
credit, less savings, fewer personal resources, and 
disproportionate suffering from previous economic 
stress and problems (Fothergill and Peek 2004; Bolin 
and Bolton 1986; Tierney 1988). Moreover, increased 
governmental spending on infrastructure protection 
could directly affect low-income communities because 
funds may be diverted away from education, social 
programs, public transportation programs, health, and 
other economic sectors (CRAG 2002; Cordova et. al). 
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How to Close the Climate Gap
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how to close  
the clIMate gap  
Closing the Climate Gap Begins with Policy 
that leaves No One Behind.
At the federal and state level, the United States 
is developing comprehensive strategies to reduce 
climate change. Currently, the primary goal of such 
policy is strictly to reduce carbon emissions, the 
leading cause of our deteriorating atmosphere. 
Yet closing the climate gap also needs to be a 
priority.  Implementing policies that protect the 
most vulnerable communities will better protect all 
Americans.
Currently, federal and state policymakers appear to 
be moving forward with a framework that includes 
capping the total amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions, lowering the cap over time and issuing 
permits as a way to ensure no one goes over the 
limit. Yet few of the most prominent climate change 
mitigation strategies close the climate gap, and in 
some cases, policies may potentially widen the gap. 
For example, one major concern with carbon 
emission reduction policies is that they will be 
regressive because the burden of rising costs will 
fall disproportionately on lower-income households 
(Walls and Janson 1996; Hassett et al. 2008). A 
study by the Congressional Budget Office (2007a) 
shows how a program implemented to cut carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions by 15 percent would cost 
3.3 percent of the average income of households in 
the lowest income bracket as opposed to only 1.7 
percent of the average income of households in the 
top income bracket. 
Other policies that raise substantial climate gap 
issues are pollution credits allocated to facilities as 
well as how revenues generated from fees on carbon 
emissions or the auctioning of emission credits will 
be distributed to society and individual consumers.
Close the Climate Gap 
by auctioning Permits or 
establishing a Fee and invest 
in Communities That Will be 
Hardest Hit 
If emission credits are allocated for free, there is 
concern that these policies will be regressive. (Dutzik 
et al. 2007). Alternatively, under cap-and-auction 
or fee-based strategies, the sale of emission credits 
to polluters could generate sizable revenues that 
could be used to offset higher costs—particularly for 
those who can least afford it (Hepburn et al. 2006). 
Revenues could be distributed to the public through 
tax cuts, investments in clean energy, high-value 
investments such as transportation, or through direct 
periodic dividends to consumers (CBO 2007a). 
Other reasons auctioning permits or establishing fees 
helps close the climate gap:  
Eliminates the need for emissions trading in •	
comparison to free-allocation programs because 
industry is likely to buy only what it needs 
(Hepburn et al. 2006).  
Decreases financial incentives to keep old •	
polluting facilities open by eliminating the 
grandfathering of old facilities.  
Decreases the problem of over-allocation and •	
excessive banking and trading of emission 
credits. 
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Close the Climate Gap by 
Maximizing Reductions in 
Greenhouse Gas emissions 
and Toxic air Pollution in 
Neighborhoods with the 
Dirtiest air. 
There is enormous potential to get more for our 
investments in climate change reduction by 
focusing on the dirtiest sources that cause both 
climate change and health problems locally. These 
sources are often concentrated in neighborhoods 
with the highest populations of low-income families 
and people of color with local toxic air emissions 
that contribute to poor health. Policymakers 
have an opportunity to be efficient and effective 
stewards of taxpayer dollars by focusing on climate 
polluters disproportionately responsible for regional 
greenhouse gas emissions and dirtying the air in 
highly impacted neighborhoods. 
Right now, most policymakers at the federal and 
state levels are missing this opportunity to close the 
climate gap, and may even exacerbate inequalities 
between affluent and poor neighborhoods by 
instituting greenhouse gas reduction policies that 
clean up the air in some places while unintentionally 
leaving the most vulnerable behind. 
In certain circumstances, cap-and-trade, the most 
prominent climate policy under consideration, 
may reduce climate emissions and toxic pollution 
regionally. Yet there are no guaranteed reductions 
at any one source (O’Neill 2004). Communities with 
the dirtiest air are concerned that with the wrong 
approach, some polluters may maintain or increase 
their emissions, creating localized dirty-air hotspots 
even if there are regional greenhouse gas reductions 
overall. 
Instead, if directed in the right way, measures to 
reduce climate emissions could also reduce other 
types of dangerous pollution in the neighborhoods 
that need it most. In California, efforts should 
be directed to neighborhoods in close proximity 
to highways, ports and other sections of the 
transportation and goods-movement corridors where 
air quality has been noted as among the worst in the 
state (CARB 2006; CARB 2008c; Morello-Frosch 
and Jesdale 2006; Morello-Frosch and Lopez 2006). 
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Low-income families and communities of color 
have a lot to gain from greenhouse gas reduction 
strategies because of the added local benefit 
of lowering toxic pollution from those same 
sources—but only if greenhouse gas reductions are 
targeted to those facilities that are located in these 
neighborhoods. More careful studies should be 
conducted to assess which climate policies would 
hold the greatest benefits for communities that suffer 
most from local air pollution (Elliott et al. 2005).
Additionally, research should characterize patterns 
of population exposure resulting from local sources 
of pollution in a variety of settings, especially in 
urban areas. Although methodologically difficult to 
develop, this could include analytical tools to track 
where carbon credits are being allocated and traded 
in order to assess the subsequent amounts of co-
pollutant emissions that may increase or decrease at 
the local level. 
Such an approach might complicate the planning 
and implementation of market or fee systems but the 
benefits for fairness and public health far outweigh 
the modest costs of extra complexity in the system.  
To facilitate this, a starting point would be developing 
mapping and analytical tools that allow policymakers 
to identify the neighborhoods with the greatest 
opportunities to maximize greenhouse gas emission 
reductions while also cleaning up toxic air pollution.
Why We Can’t afford to Focus Only on
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reductions
Today, most climate policy strategies focus 
exclusively on lowering greenhouse gases, without 
regard to what other benefits we can achieve if we 
focus on reducing greenhouse gases from sources 
that also emit dangerous and toxic pollutants. In a 
struggling economy where most Americans continue 
to rank air pollution as a leading concern, working 
to get more health and environmental benefits from 
one policy protection should be a goal of efficient, 
effective governments. 
Failure to take under strong consideration sources 
that contribute to both climate change and toxic air 
pollution can also lead to a widening of the climate 
gap between the health benefits achieved by some 
and the health consequences faced by others. It 
can mean that while regional air improves, the air in 
some neighborhoods gets dirtier. 
For example, a study of the Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (RECLAIM), an emission trading 
system designed to lower nitrogen oxide emissions 
in Southern California, indicates that the program 
may have increased nitrogen oxide emissions in 
Wilmington, California, while region-wide emission 
levels declined (Lejano and Hirose 2005). Further, 
under one of the rules, licensed car scrappers were 
allowed to purchase old, polluting vehicles and 
destroy them, and in return receive emission credits 
by the South Coast Air Quality Monitoring District 
(SCAQMD) that could be sold to oil refineries (Drury 
et al. 1999). The majority of the emission credits 
were purchased by four oil companies: Unocal, 
Chevron, Ultramar, and GATX to avoid the cost of 
installing pollution-reduction technologies. The 
trading program led to a situation where workers 
and local residents of these communities were 
unnecessarily exposed to benzene, a known human 
carcinogen, and other volatile organic compounds 
that were contained in the emissions and that 
these emissions could have been remediated by 
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pollution reduction technologies that were already in 
widespread use in similar port operations along the 
West Coast (Drury et al. 1999).
ensuring New Fuels Don’t increase Pollution 
in low-income and Minority Communities 
 
The lesson learned in California from the experiment 
with MTBE—a fuel additive that reduced air 
pollution, but was quickly banned after research 
found that it polluted drinking water—has critical 
implications for how we can close the climate gap. 
Similarly, ethanol—a biofuel proposed for broader 
use by California and federal policymakers to 
help combat climate change—could reduce our 
dependence on oil. However, biofuel refineries 
could harm the health of adjacent communities 
by exposing them to the chemical and microbial 
byproducts of the distillation processes necessary for 
fuel production (Madsen 2006). 
Research also predicts that some ethanol fuels may 
increase ozone-related deaths, hospitalization, and 
asthma by 9 percent in Los Angeles and 4 percent 
nationwide if used to power vehicles (Jacobson 
2007). Low-income and minority communities, 
which are disproportionately clustered near highways 
and goods transport corridors, would bear the 
majority of the burden. 
Lastly, it should be noted that growing crops for fuel 
will likely raise prices of food crops (Tenenbaum 
2008). This would be most damaging to low-income 
consumers and low-income agricultural laborers 
who are most vulnerable to job loss and hunger 
(Tenenbaum 2008).
Other Key Recommendations 
to Close the Climate Gap 
More research is needed to look at the rates and 
impacts of climate change events that are projected 
to occur. Identifying possible mitigation and 
adaptation strategies that would reduce climate-
related illnesses and deaths, particularly in the most 
vulnerable communities, should be a priority for the 
regulatory community as well as policymakers.
Close the Health impacts Gap Between People 1. 
of Color and the Poor, and the Rest of the 
Population.  
Focus Planning and intervention in Poor and •	
Minority Neighborhoods. Because burdens of 
heat-related illness are borne disproportionately 
by groups of older residents, children, and 
those of low socioeconomic status (Knowlton 
et al. 2009; English 2007; Basu and Ostro 
2008), preparedness strategies should include 
messages and information about avoiding 
extreme heat exposure that are disseminated 
and targeted toward parents and caregivers of 
young children, and the elderly (Knowlton et al. 
2009). Climate change interventions to address 
the built environment should prioritize vulnerable 
groups who live in neighborhoods with high 
risks of heat island effects, poor housing quality 
and a lack of access to transportation to escape 
extreme weather events. These proactive 
strategies could go a long way to reduce the 
disproportionate burden of heat-related health 
effects on the poor and communities of color. 
Use New Mapping Technologies to identify •	
Vulnerable Neighborhoods. Differential exposures 
to the health-damaging impacts of climate 
change, such as excessive heat and extreme 
weather events could be examined from a 
geographical equity perspective by using 
GIS maps overlaid with vulnerability models 
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and current socioeconomic, racial/ethnicity, 
and cultural group distributions in California. 
Interaction of these data layers should be taken 
into account when developing climate change 
policy (Elliott et al. 2005), so as to reduce the 
likelihood that future policies would create 
disproportionate burdens on already vulnerable 
populations. 
Research the Potential Benefits and Harms of New •	
Fuels. Policymakers must take steps to better 
assess the effects of exposure to new fuels (i.e., 
ethanol) as well as increased emissions of other 
pollutants during combustion (Jacobson 2007) 
and production on those already feeling the 
negative impact of the climate gap. More studies 
must also focus on the dangers of food shortages 
and food price increases associated with the 
production of ethanol and other biofuel crops 
(Tenenbaum 2008). Obtaining this information 
could illuminate whether biofuels are a viable 
solution or would simply widen the climate gap. 
Measure the Success of Mitigation Strategies •	
by Whether They Protect everyone. Runaway 
climate change, where positive feedback loops 
drive warming irrespective of human mitigation 
actions, could occur (NRC 2002; Gjerde et 
al. 1999; Pizer 2003). As we enact policies 
to reduce the chances that full scale global 
warming will occur, we must also develop 
downstream adaptation strategies such as 
infrastructure protection, efficient and effective 
air-cooling technologies, and better surveillance 
for emerging infectious diseases. If we don’t 
pay close attention to the climate gap from the 
beginning,  disparities between populations 
of differing socioeconomic status will likely 
increase. 
Design Research That identifies Opportunities •	
for Targeting Greenhouse Gas Reductions to 
Reduce Toxic air emissions in Highly Polluted 
Neighborhoods. In order to design proper 
policies and monitor the efficacy of climate 
policies, future research should: (1) explore 
how to characterize, quantify, and maximize 
reducing both climate and toxic pollution in 
existing or new “toxic hotspots”; (2) determine 
the geographic scale at which these evaluations 
can take place given the data available; and (3) 
identify the data necessary to improve future 
evaluations. 
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Develop Policies that Close the Gap Between the 2. 
economic Disparities Faced by People of Color 
and the Poor, and the Rest of the Population.  
Because climate change and climate solutions are 
likely to negatively impact certain economic sectors 
more than others, policies must take into account 
how low-income families and people of color will be 
affected and what more can be done to help them 
adjust to major economic shifts. Some important 
policy directions include: 
Examine which greenhouse gas source sectors •	
hold the most pollution reduction promise 
without economic disruption, both in terms of 
overall emission reductions and environmental 
health benefits (Prasad 2008);  
Anticipate and address inevitable job shifts and •	
retraining needs to maximize opportunities for 
low-income communities and communities of 
color to successfully transition to and benefit 
from a new, clean energy economy;   
Ensure that revenue generated from climate •	
policy will help high-poverty neighborhoods 
absorb the higher prices for energy and other 
basic necessities.   
Close the Conversation Gap.3. 
Because climate change will affect some populations 
more than others, it is important to capture the 
specific vulnerabilities of different neighborhoods. 
Local expertise, community wisdom, and other 
contextual information are important to supplement 
technical knowledge. Researchers hoping to 
generate climate change-impact knowledge 
that is sensitive to community-specific concerns 
should integrate community participation in their 
studies (Morello-Frosch et al. 2005; Minkler and 
Wallerstein 2003; Coburn J. 2009). To proactively 
address the climate gap, ensure the effectiveness of 
preparedness and adaptation strategies and alleviate 
environmental health inequalities, agency officials 
and policymakers must ensure that vulnerable 
communities play a prominent role in shaping future 
solutions to climate change in California (Elliott et al. 
2005). 
But it’s more than just the regulatory agencies and 
affected communities.  Policy differences between 
those who favor “cap and trade” vs. those who 
support carbon fees have led to tensions between 
advocates that share the goals of protecting the 
planet and protecting the poor. Concerns about 
whether climate policy will cost or create jobs have 
led to strains between those working to recover the 
economy and those working to save the planet. 
These tensions have led to a conversation gap.
One of the first steps to addressing the climate gap is 
addressing this conversation gap.  Working together 
— across sectors and constituencies—and insuring 
that the effects of climate change and climate policy 
are not unequally felt by the poor and communities 
of color  is exactly the recipe we need to cool the 
planet and create economic opportunities and health 
benefits for everyone. 
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conclusIons 
This analysis of available data connects the dots 
between some facts we’ve known and others we 
haven’t to reveal a hidden climate gap. 
The climate gap means that climate change will 
more seriously affect the health of communities that 
are least likely to cope with, resist, and recover from 
the impacts of extreme weather events and potential 
increases in air pollution compared to the rest of the 
population (Knowlton et al. 2004). Further, low-
income and minority communities could be more 
seriously harmed by the economic shocks associated 
with climate change both in price increases for 
basic necessities (i.e., water, energy, and food) and 
by threats of job loss due to economic and climatic 
shifts that affect industries such as agriculture and 
tourism (Stern 2006). 
Policymakers have a clear choice:  ignoring the 
climate gap could reinforce and amplify current as 
well as future socioeconomic and racial disparities. 
On the other hand, policymakers can proactively 
close the climate gap through strategies that address 
the regressive economic and health impacts of 
climate change, and that lift all boats by ensuring 
that everyone shares equally in the benefits of 
climate solutions, and no one is left bearing more 
than their fair share of the burdens. 
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appendIx 
California’s Climate Policy: Moving in the 
Right Direction, but Room for improvement on 
Reducing Climate and Toxic Pollution in the 
Dirtiest Neighborhoods 
Two critically dangerous sources of air pollution that 
will be addressed through greenhouse gas reduction 
measures in California are nitrogen oxide (NOx), a 
precursor of ozone formation and particulate matter, 
which contributes to 3,500 premature deaths every 
year, along with a handful of illnesses (Bailey et al. 
2008).  
Thanks to California’s climate policy, nitrogen oxide 
is expected to be reduced by 86,000 tons by 2020, 
more than three quarters of which will be achieved 
through regulatory requirements for cleaner cars 
and trucks (Bailey et al. 2008). Projected particulate 
matter and nitrogen oxide reductions together are 
estimated to prevent approximately 780 premature 
deaths, 11,000 fewer cases of asthma-related and 
other lower respiratory symptoms, 980 fewer cases of 
acute bronchitis, and 77,000 fewer work days lost in 
California (CARB 2008b). These health benefits are 
projected to be valued at $1.4 billion to $2.3 billion 
in 2020 (Bailey et al. 2008). Moreover, actual health 
and economic benefits of these climate change 
policies may be underestimated because many 
emission reduction measures and public health 
benefits such as reduced cancer risks have not been 
accounted for (Bailey et al. 2008). 
Known carcinogens that may be reduced are 
benzene, formaldehyde, and toluene, predominantly 
produced directly and indirectly by mobile sources 
and by the refining and combustion of fossil fuels 
(EPA 2005). These air toxics are important to 
closing the climate gap, as several studies indicate 
that communities of color and the poor bear a 
disproportionate burden of health risks associated 
with air toxics exposures (CARB 2008c; Morello-
Frosch and Jesdale 2006; Morello-Frosch et al. 
2002; Morello-Frosch and Shenasa 2006).
California’s early action Measures Could Go 
a long Way to Closing the Climate Gap  
The California Air Resources Board’s plans also 
include Early Action Measures (EAMs) that could 
be enforceable on or before 2010 (HSC §38560.5, 
Health and Safety Code Section 38560–38565). 
These policies include regulations affecting 
landfills, motor vehicle fuels, refrigerant in cars, 
port operations, and many other sources in 2007, 
including nine Discrete Early Action measures for 
which the CARB will adopt regulations by the end 
of 2009 (CARB 2007; CARB 2008b). It is estimated 
that if all Early Action Measures are adopted together 
with the additional proposed measures, 52,000 tons 
of nitrogen oxide and particulate matter pollution 
would be removed from the air, which would lead 
to a further decrease in exposure to unhealthy local 
pollution. It would also prevent an additional $1.1 
billion to $1.8 billion in health costs in the year 2020 
alone (Bailey et al. 2008). 
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Table 2. Estimates of California air quality-related health benefits in 2020 if AB 32 Implementation Measures are Implemented. (Source: CARB 2008c) 
These measures could potentially benefit poor 
and minority neighborhoods that tend to host 
significant industrial and transportation emission 
sources. However, these projected benefits have 
only been quantified at the state level, and more 
work needs to be done by the Air Resources Board 
and other researchers to examine more closely how 
regional greenhouse gas reductions will impact 
the distribution of toxic air pollution reductions in 
neighborhoods struggling w ith the dirtiest air. This 
assessment will be essential to closing the climate 
gap in California.  
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